The popular uprising in Syria started in March 2011, and transformed 
INTRODUCTION
The popular uprising in Syria was only a domestic problem in its initial phase. When it turned into a civil war, it started to affect the Middle East in different aspects. Lately, it has become a global concern, with the Syrian refugees and foreign terrorist fighters making the headlines. While no political solution is imminent in the near future, the Syrian crisis is one of the most complex problems in the political history with its cross border effects increasing day by day.
While the international community started to feel the direct consequences of the Syrian crisis and started to engage in a discussion about its resolution, the neighboring countries, namely, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, were already dealing with the effects of the crisis since 2011. These four countries have been struggling to overcome the social, economic and political challenges caused by the Syrian crisis beyond, the scope of the refugees and security problems related to the ISIS. However, the effects of the Syrian crisis and the related developments on Iraq have been very different in comparison to the other neighboring countries.
As a neighboring country to Syria, Iraq has already been undergoing a major political crisis, before the onset of the Syrian crisis. The negative consequences of the policies pursued by the former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, especially during his second term after 2010, were intensified after the complete withdrawal of American troops by the end of 2011. Because of Maliki's sectarian and repressive policies, problems between Baghdad and Sunni-populated areas of the country, as well as between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), were already there.
In this respect, taken together with Iraq's situation even before the Syrian crisis, it can be said that, Iraq is the most influenced regional country from the Syrian crisis in terms of security dimension.
However, the effect of the Syrian crisis on Iraq has not been limited to the territorial security. Overall became displaced within Iraq as IDP due to direct or indirect effects of the Syrian crisis. Nonetheless, it is also useful to mention that Iraq had already been subjected to the systematical internal displacement policies, even before the Syrian crisis. For instance, during the Saddam period, forcing the people to live in some parts of the country or leave their homes was a political tool used to change the demographics of the country. Similar policies were still being used in the post-Saddam Iraq.
Moreover, political tensions and instability in Iraq, which emerged after the overthrow of the Saddam regime and increased incrementally together with the repressive policies of the Maliki government, had already deepened the problems related with Iraqi refugees and displaced persons in Iraq, long before the Syrian crisis. In this sense, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) 2007 estimates, while 2,256,000 Iraqis were forcefully displaced within the country, those between 2 million and 2.5 million had to immigrate to other countries because of security-related reasons. It is also important to note that the data regarding the Iraqi IDPs provided by different sources may show some serious differences, due to the impossibility of an extensive field-research in conflict Despite the incoherence between the estimates developed by different agencies, their common point is the growing trend in the problem of IDPs in Iraq, which started to escalate after the ISIS attacks in December 2013 and reached incomparably higher levels than the previous waves of IDPs.
Moreover, these displacement strategies are strategically used to change demography and the political geography in the country, sometimes under the pretext of fighting ISIS threat. by Maliki afterwards, especially during his second political term, increased radical tendencies among most parts of the Iraqi Sunni Arabs. In this sense, the conflicts intensified in December 2013, which led to the displacement of almost 500,000 Iraqi people. Such dynamics also played an important role in raising radical tendencies among the Sunni Arabs in the country. Consequently, when ISIS turned back to Iraq after its Syrian experience, in which the group built its initial military capacity, a considerable amount of Iraqi Sunnis had already been radicalized, or at least, they were inclined for radicalization.
The ISIS was not received as an occupation force by all parts of the local people in the regions under its control. On the contrary, some of the Iraqi Sunnis considered ISIS as an alternative which would save them from the Shia pressure by helping re-establish the Sunni Arab political power in the country. Some others considered it as an authority that would be able to implement the Islamic rules effectively in the country. Consequently, when the ISIS invaded Mosul, it was welcomed by the local supporters, instead of facing major resistance, largely because of such factors. (Lefler, 2014) In the process, ISIS has increased immigration and internal displacements of a number of minority groups as well as the Shiites. A considerable number of the local Sunni population were living in the regions that later fell under ISIS control. Although the exact number of people who live in the areas under ISIScontrol remained vague, the estimates were around 8 and 10 million. (Collard, 2014) Meanwhile, many During the interviews, some Iraqi Sunnis, who were forced to flee their homes due to ISIS attacks, told that they prefer immigration to the ISIS-controlled areas because there is public order and they have better alternatives in comparison to difficult living conditions existing in the regions where they seek shelter. Also during the interviews, it was observed that some Iraqi people, who had been forced to move to Kirkuk by fleeing their homes in Tel Afar and other regions, were trying to return liberated areas but they had major problems.
To sum up, the radicalization tendencies among the Sunni Arabs already existed before the Syrian crisis. The crisis erupting in Syria has given a new momentum to these radicalization tendencies. The ISIS has been seen as the first serious alternative to the Shia-dominated Baghdad government in post-2003 Iraq by the Sunni Arabs. Moreover, as it will be discussed below, during the campaign against the ISIS which began in the aftermath of Mosul invasion, a great number of revanchist behaviors towards the Sunni population who live in the regions retaken from the ISIS control were reported. These revanchist behaviors or speculations of particularly certain Shiite militia served to escalate radicalization tendencies among the Sunni Arabs. Accordingly, it is important to highlight that the radicalization problem among the Sunni Arabs is likely to transform into a vicious cycle. Consequently, this radicalization problem presents a quite serious threat before the stability in Iraq.
Radicalization among Shiites
Sunni Arabs are not the only radicalizing group in Iraq; some other serious radical tendencies have also emerged. There has been escalation of the Shia radicalization in Iraq as well. Shia groups were already engaging in paramilitary activities before the crisis. There were especially two groups among the Shia militias that were mostly known: the Badr Brigades, which was established as the become a prominent actor, largely independent of the Iraqi Army.
In addition to the risks that may stem from uncontrolled violent actions of the Iraqi security forces in Sunni-populated regions of Iraq, al-Hashd al-Shaabi, whose size is estimated to be between 50,000 and 90,000 paramilitary fighters, has the potential to become a serious threat for the future of the country, unless necessary measures to control it are taken timely. Undoubtedly, there are some groups and people who joined the militias of al-Hasd al-Shaabi with the aim of preserving or retaking their regions from ISIS. However, some factors such as the establishment of this umbrella organization together with al-Sistani's fatwa for jihad, the formation of its forces predominantly by the Shiites, and the obvious Iranian support behind it in terms of organization, training and operations, led non-Shiite parts of the Iraqi people to become suspicious towards that militia organization. (Duman, 2015a: 11-14) Furthermore, in addition to the casualties suffered by al-Hashd al-Shaabi in its fight against ISIS, violent attitudes of its militias towards the local people in the areas retaken from the ISIS pave the way for the escalation of radicalism as a problem which re-produces itself continuously between the Shiites and the Sunnis.
Radicalization among Kurdish Groups
The and also the intra-Kurdish tensions, at least in the short-term. However, due to this heightened threat perception among the Iraqi Kurds as they were concerned about the existence of their national identity and the KRG, some Kurdish actors also developed a further radicalized attitude towards both the Sunni Arabs and the Shiites.
To sum up, it is possible to claim that the Syrian crisis and its repercussions have contributed to the increase in radicalization in Iraq. The rising trend of radicalization in Iraq affect all Iraqis who are either perpetrators or victims of this process. However, the radical tendencies are especially intensified among the Sunni Arabs and the Shiites in Iraq. As it will be mentioned below, although a number of ethnic and religious minorities are affected by this new wave of radicalization, the group that suffered the most in this process has become the Turkmens. At any rate, fighting the effects of radicalization will take quite a long time due to its self-perpetuating characteristics, even if the ISIS is eradicated and Syrian crisis is ended. Therefore, radicalization will be a major problem in the future of Iraqi politics and society.
REPERCUSSIONS ON IRAQI SOCIETY
The Syrian crisis has inevitably created some societal effects on Iraq. These societal effects which are related to the other ones resulted in the emergence of humanitarian problems which are hard to recover in the short-term. Most of humanitarian problems are man-made and products of the conflict. All the groups in Iraq which have armed forces invariably use their military capacity as an element of oppression and gains against the civilians, or at least the people who have relatively weak military power. The crisis in Syria and the expansion of ISIS through its drastic attacks and gains in
Iraq have added a new dimension to the humanitarian emergencies. As noted above, the displacement of Iraqis on the basis of ethnic, sectarian, or political identities was already a problem for the Iraqis, even before the Syrian crisis. After the Syrian crisis, the displacements in Iraq started to be encountered more frequently at various degrees. Consequently, it can be noted that the Syrian crisis turned the IDP problem in Iraq into a more dangerous threat for the country's societal integrity, than was the case before.
As a result of these deliberately implemented policies of displacement in Iraq, in addition to the emergence of humanitarian tragedy, the demographical borders started to be redrawn, multiculturalism started to be undone, while certain ethnic/sectarian concentrations emerged in particular regions of the country. This situation undoubtedly threatens the social integrity and the future of Iraq, while it also poses a serious risk to increase radicalization in the country.
In the modern history of Iraq, displacements were used politically. This policy firstly emerged in the 1970s, then passed two turning points during the Saddam period: the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s and the Gulf War in 1990-91. During this period, the displacements were state-led activities which were carried out by using security forces, mainly against the Kurdish people, and also the Arab Shiites partially. By the year of 2003, it was reported that about 1 million Iraqi people had been internally displaced in the country. (Lischer, 2008: 102-103 testimonies, fieldwork and the satellite images concluded that some villages were totally destroyed due to these operations conducted by the Shiite militias and the Iraqi security forces. For instance, as a Peshmerga imprisoned Arabs in "the security zones" which had already been retaken from the ISIS control. According to the report, the Peshmerga and the local security forces prevented the displaced
Arabs from returning to their homes in Erbil and Ninawa because of the security reasons. Such restrictions, however, did not apply to the Kurdish people who had previously been living in these provinces together with the Arabs. The report also indicates numerous arbitrary detentions and plundering crimes perpetrated by the KRG forces towards the Arabs and their homes in the regions, which were retaken from the ISIS. Similarly, the report also reveals some serious plundering crimes acted by the Peshmerga in Tel Uskuf, a predominantly Christian-populated area, even after the end of ISIS control. Another problematic part of this development is that these plundered areas by the Peshmerga were previously under the control of the central government, not the KRG, as noted in the report.
The prevalent insecurity together with the ISIS threat led to the intensification of security measures all across the country. However, during our fieldwork in Iraq, we observed that non-Kurdish -but especially Arab-people who were travelling from Kirkuk to Erbil were subjected to more strict security controls and the police inquiry than those of Kurdish origin at the entrance of Erbil on the Kirkuk-Erbil highway. Such measures are potentially feeding intra-communal tensions across the country.
Kirkuk has become one of the most affected areas from the crisis. Namely, while Kirkuk was being threatened by the ISIS on the one hand, it also witnessed an implicit power struggle between Tal Afar district of Mosul, where the population was about 520,000 and the majority was made of the Turkmens, had been displaced, while many other Turkmen villages of Mosul had also been evacuated.
Some of the Turkmens who immigrated from Tal Afar had taken refuge in Najaf, Karbala, and Babel, while some others had immigrated to the other Iraqi cities such as Dohuk, Erbil and Kirkuk. Besides these internal displacements, some Turkmens had emigrated from Tal Afar and other places to Turkey as well. In addition to Tal Afar, Tuz Khurmatu district of Saladin province where the population was formed by Turkmen majority also witnessed refugee movements.
To sum up, the forced migration or internal displacements of the Iraqi people due to security reasons have negative societal effects on Iraq in the long-term, regardless of the perpetrator, which, depending on the context, may be one of those: the ISIS, the Iraqi Army, the Shiite militias, the Peshmerga, or any other armed groups. The motivations behind these displacements, the authorities' willingness to prevent them or allow returns to the areas liberated from the ISIS are political. The policy responses to displacement are not triggered by actual security conditions, as much as they are by specific political agendas. The political motivations of different actors mainly seek to achieve ethnic and, or sectarian concentration in the regions under their control.
CONCLUSION
The effects of the Syrian crisis and the related developments on Iraq have been very different in comparison to the other neighboring countries. The most remarkable difference has been the weakening of the national integrity of Iraq, while in terms of territorial integrity, it came to the verge of disintegration. The crisis inevitably had an effect in terms of immigration and population movements. Although there was a lower rate of immigration from Syria to Iraq in comparison to the other regional countries, the problems posed by the IDPs were much deeper for Iraq than the others.
This situation is closely related to the evolution of and rise in radicalization in Iraq. Hence, the incremental trend of radicalization affects all parts of the Iraqi society, who are either perpetrators or victims in this process. In this sense, it is possible to note that radical tendencies in Iraq have been intensified, especially among the Sunni Arabs and the Shiites. While a large number of ethnic and religious minorities have been affected by the growing radicalization in Iraq, the Turkmens have been the group that suffered the most. Since undoing the damage caused by radicalization will take a long time and the radicalization among different groups is mutually reinforcing each other, it will continue to be a problem even after the ISIS threat is eradicated and the Syrian crisis comes to an end.
The problems caused by different forms of internal displacement and forced migration remain there and they will continue to have negative societal effects on Iraq in the long-term. The perpetrator may be one of the several groups in deliberate acts of displacements: the ISIS, the Iraqi Army, the Shiite militias, the Peshmerga, or any other armed group from different ethnic or sectarian communities. The main reason for selective prevention of these displacements and especially returns is driven by political, rather than security motivations. This political motivation basically aims to provide ethnic/sectarian concentration in the regions under a specific group's control. Such acts change demographical geography, and are seen as gains by the actors who control such regions in the shortterm. However, it contains significant risks for the societal integrity of Iraq in the medium and long-
